This news item continues the reporting on key EU reactions following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022: the impact of the invasion on the EU’s internal security policy, on criminal law, and on the protection of the EU’s financial interests. The following overview covers the period from July 2024 to the end of September 2024. For overviews of the developments from February 2022 to mid-July 2022 → eucrim 2/2022, 74-80; for the developments from the end of July 2022 to the end of October 2022→ eucrim 3/2022, 170-171; for the developments from November 2022 to December 2022 → eucrim 4/2022, 226-228; for the developments from January 2023 to June 2023 → eucrim 1/2023, 6-9; for the developments from July 2023 to September 2023 → eucrim 2/2023, 116-117; for the developments from October 2023 to January 2024 → eucrim 4/2023, 313-315; from January 2024 to June 2024 → eucrim 1/2024, 9-11.

• 12 July 2024: Eurojust and the United States Department of Justice organise a key meeting that addresses the question on the effective fight against the illicit export of goods to Russia in light of its ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine. Participants particularly discuss the threats posed by the acquisition of sensitive technology by non-allied nations.
• 17 July 2024: The newly elected European Parliament reaffirms its strong support for Ukraine amidst Russia's ongoing war. In a resolution passed on 17 July 2024, MEPs emphasised the EU's commitment to providing military support to Ukraine as long as, and in whatever form, is necessary. The resolution also calls for maintaining and extending EU sanctions against Russia and Belarus as well as systematically tackling the circumvention of these sanctions by EU-based companies, third parties, and non-EU countries. MEPs welcome recent EU efforts to use Russian assets frozen by the EU in support of Ukraine. They call for a “sound legal regime for the confiscation of Russian state-owned assets frozen by the EU”. The Commission is urged to propose long-term financial assistance for Ukraine's reconstruction, building on the experience of the newly established Ukraine Facility. The resolution also condemns Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's recent visit to Russia, labeling it a "blatant violation of the EU treaties and and common foreign policy". According to the text, Hungary should face repercussions for these actions.
• 26 July 2024: The EU gives green light for the first payment of €1.5 billion to Ukraine that was generated from immobilised assets of the Russian Central Bank. These extraordinary revenues were generated by EU operators and held by central securities depositories (CSDs) from immobilised Russian sovereign assets. They were made available by Euroclear to the Commission as a first instalment on 23 July. The money will now be channelled through the European Peace Facility and to the Ukraine Facility to support Ukraine's military capabilities as well as to support the country's reconstruction. The underlying legal acts enabling the use of the CSDs' profits for Ukraine were adopted by the Council on 21 May 2024 (→ eucrim 1/2024, 9).
• 6 August 2024: The Council approves the first (regular) payments of grants and loans under the EU's Ukraine Facility. Ukraine is now set to receive almost €4.2 billion from the EU. The Council concluded that Ukraine had satisfied the necessary conditions and reforms envisaged in the Ukraine Plan for receiving the funds. The Ukraine Facility was agreed upon at the beginning of 2024 and foresees up to €50 billion of stable financing, in grants and loans, to support Ukraine's recovery, reconstruction, and modernisation for the period 2024 to 2027 (→ eucrim 1/2024, 9).
• 13 August 2024: The Commission disburses €4.2 billion as first regular payment under the Ukraine Facility. The disbursement was endorsed by the Council on 6 August (see above). Initial payments under the Facility were already made beforehand: €6 billion in bridge financing and €1.9 billion in pre-financing.
• 24 August 2024: On occasion of Ukraine's independence day, the EU is reconfirming its unwavering support to Ukraine as it defends itself against Russia. “Europe will always be at Ukraine’s side, because Ukraine is Europe,” says European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her video message. She also points out that the EU and its Member States have made available €114 billion to Ukraine so far. The Ukraine flag is unfurled in front of the European Parliament and several EU buildings in Brussels are illuminated in Ukrainian colours.
• 10 September 2024: The seven members of the Eurojust-supported Joint Investigation Team (JIT) on alleged core international crimes committed in Ukraine (→ eucrim 1/2024, 8-9) agreed to amend the JIT Agreement to enhance investigations into crimes of torture, ill-treatment, and filtration. The JIT, which was set up in 2022, today consists of Ukraine, six EU Member States (Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, and Romania), the International Criminal Court (ICC), and Europol. The work of the JIT is additionally supported by the Core International Crimes Evidence Database (CICED), which was launched by Eurojust in February 2023, and by the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression Against Ukraine (ICPA). So far, the CICED has received thousands of files for preservation and analysis from various countries, including Ukraine.
• 11 September 2024: The "United for Justice Conference" in Kyiv discusses the urgent need to investigate and prosecute war crimes involving the targeting of civil objects by Russia in Ukraine. Participants also exchange ideas on how to mobilise resources to deter the commission of these crimes and effectively deal with their consequences.
• 19 September 2024: Considering the latest developments of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, an EP resolution calls on EU Member States to continue their financial and military support to Ukraine. The resolution follows the resolution of 17 July 2024 (see above) and mainly addresses the EU Member States. The EP underlines that Ukraine must have the possibility to defend itself fully and deplores the declining volume of bilateral military aid to Ukraine by EU countries. EU Member States should maintain and extend the Council’s sanctions policy against Russia, Belarus, and non-EU countries and entities providing Russia with military and dual-use technologies. More Chinese individuals and entities should be added to the EU sanctions list. MEPs reiterate their demands that tougher measures must be taken to systematically tackle the issue of sanctions circumvention. In addition, the EU must establish a sound legal regime for the confiscation of Russian state-owned assets frozen by the EU as part of efforts to compensate Ukraine for the massive damage it has suffered (see also above).
• 24 September 2024: OLAF hosts a meeting of the G7 Sub-Working Group on Export Control Enforcement. Experts discuss the latest developments in the fight against the circumvention of sanctions and export controls that restrict Russia’s access to technologies and other materials required to sustain its military operations. The group agreed on a joint guidance for industry that aims to facilitate the identification of circumvention practices.