This article aims to conceptualise and map Europe’s Eastern Partnership that is under attack from the outside – notably by Russia. It analyses the impacts of Russia’s hybrid warfare on the European Union. Russia’s relationship with the West is characterised by the collective trauma and stigma associated with the disintegration of the USSR, which inspired Putin’s geopolitical vision. However, in recent years, Putin’s Russia has sought to re-establish itself on the world stage by projecting power, harking back to the height of Soviet influence in the 1970s and 1980s. In this endeavour, Russia has used both private military companies and far-right terrorist groups in its hybrid war strategy against the European Union. This article analyses this development, suggesting that Russia is aiming to establish itself as an expansionist power in Europe with little regard for international law and norms.

Since 2014 persons allegedly involved in or supporting the undermining or threatening of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine are subject to freezing measures against their property and other financial resources within the European Union. As part of several comprehensive political and economic sanctioning packages initiated by the Commission and the Council after the invasion of February 2022, these financial sanctions have been significantly extended, currently targeting, inter alia, some 1,200 individuals, most of them of Russian nationality. This article provides a general overview of the concept of the EU's so-called targeted ("smart") sanctions and the adaption of this instrument to Russia's warfare in Ukraine, followed by an exploration of the plans for a further tightening of such measures as proposed by the European Commission. The intention is to go beyond the – temporary – freezing of assets owned by listed individuals and entities, thus promoting their seizure … Read more

This article discusses the two-step approach proposed by the Commission to end impunity for those violating sanctions (“Union restrictive measures”) following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The first step concerns a proposal for a Council Decision identifying the violation of Union restrictive measures as an area of crime that meets the criteria specified in Article 83(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Council is expected to formally adopt that Decision in October 2022, which will be the first time that the list of EU crimes is extended. This will allow the Commission to then immediately put forward a Directive on the definition of criminal offences and penalties for the violation of Union restrictive measures as a second step. In this regard, the Commission already suggested elements for such a future Directive in a Communication. Appropriate consultations are ongoing to ensure a high-quality text which empowers law … Read more

EU sanctions against Russia are unprecedented in their breadth, as well as in the seriousness of the wrongdoing they seek to address. As a result, the EU finds itself in uncharted waters as it develops its sanctions policy vis-à-vis Russia. This paper offers an overview of three strategic issues that are likely to impact the further evolution of EU policy in this area, namely: the objectives that EU sanctions against Russia can pursue; the fate of hundreds of billions of dollars’ worth of Russian assets reportedly frozen across EU Member States; and the possible humanitarian impact of sanctions on Russian population. While questions associated with each of these issues admit of no easy answers, thinking through them will be essential to shaping a coherent, credible and effective sanctions policy in response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.

The situation concerning corruption in Ukraine before the Russian invasion was not particularly encouraging: there were no significant improvements on the ground; independent, newly established, specialised anti-corruption bodies were being hindered from doing their job in every possible way. As in almost all countries participating in armed conflicts, it is entirely understandable that fighting corruption is no longer a priority now that the country is under attack. When the war is over, the Ukrainian anti-corruption framework will be weaker than it was before the war, yet it will face a series of new challenges, especially those resulting from the vast influx of material and financial support for humanitarian purposes and for the reconstruction of the country. In order to avoid a scenario in which the country, having survived the war, could become a victim of corruption, the Ukrainian government, supported by the international community, will have the important task of … Read more