This news item continues the reporting on key EU/CoE reactions following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022: the impact on the protection of the EU’s financial interests, on the EU’s internal security policy, and on criminal law.

The following overview covers the period from late April to October 2025. For overviews of developments in previous periods → eucrim 1/2025, 6-7, → eucrim 4/2024, 267-268 and →eucrim 3/2024, 174-176, each with further references.

• 9 May 2025: On Europe Day, representatives of the EU, Council of Europe, Ukraine, and an international coalition of states meet in Lviv to formally endorse the creation of a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine. The Tribunal, to be established within the framework of the Council of Europe, will have jurisdiction to investigate, prosecute, and try Russian political and military leaders responsible for the crime of aggression. The decision follows two years of preparatory work, including the efforts of the Core Group and the International Centre for the Prosecution of the Crime of Aggression at Eurojust. The Tribunal’s establishment will be based on an agreement between Ukraine and the Council of Europe, with evidence from ongoing national and joint investigations to be made available to its Prosecutor.
• 9 May 2025: The Commission approves an extra €3 billion to help Member States implement the Pact on Migration and Asylum and host refugees from Ukraine. The funding, drawn from the revised MFF and migration instruments, adds to the €11 billion already allocated for 2025–2027.
• 10 May 2025: The European Union states its commitment to a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace in Ukraine, grounded in the UN Charter and international law. Together with Ukraine, the United States, and other international partners, the EU calls for a full and unconditional 30-day ceasefire as a vital step towards reducing civilian suffering and creating space for meaningful peace talks aimed at ending Russia’s war of aggression.
• 12 May 2025: The Council approves conclusions on the European Court of Auditors’ report assessing cohesion policy measures for Ukrainian refugees in Europe. The conclusions welcome the audit findings and highlight that the CARE, CARE Plus, and FAST-CARE initiatives gave Member States greater flexibility and liquidity to redirect cohesion funds in response to the refugee crisis triggered by Russia’s war of aggression. The report notes that these tools helped finance urgent support for displaced people and were generally seen as useful by national authorities, though their uptake varied across programmes and countries.
• 12 May 2025: The Council prolongs the restrictive measures against cyberattacks threatening the EU and its Member States for another year (until 18 May 2026). The sanctions regime for these measures has been extended for three years (until 18 May 2028).
• 13 May 2025: The Commission raised €7 billion through a 20-year EU-Bond, marking its fifth syndicated transaction of 2025. While the funds will contribute to various EU programmes, a significant share is earmarked for supporting Ukraine. Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the EU has disbursed nearly €16.2 billion to Kyiv under the Ukraine Facility, which is set to provide up to €33 billion in loans between 2024 and 2027. An additional €4 billion has been allocated under the new €18 billion macro-financial assistance scheme, to be repaid from immobilised Russian state assets. With this latest issuance, the EU continues to channel substantial financial resources into sustaining Ukraine’s economy and resilience against Russia’s aggression.
• 20 May 2025: The Council imposes additional restrictive measures against 21 individuals and six entities responsible for Russia’s destabilising activities. The new listings target actors engaged in propaganda, espionage, cyber operations, and efforts to undermine democratic processes in EU Member States and partner countries.
• 20 May 2025: The Council broadens the sanctions framework to cover tangible assets such as vessels, aircraft, real estate, digital and communication infrastructure, as well as financial transactions involving banks and crypto service providers linked to Russian hybrid threats. In addition, the EU gains the ability to suspend the broadcasting licences of Russian state-controlled media outlets spreading disinformation in Europe.
• 20 May 2025: The Council adopts its 17th package of sanctions against Russia, the most far-reaching since the start of the war. The measures cut off access to key military technology, curb energy revenues, and target Russia’s “shadow fleet” of oil tankers. The package imposes sanctions on 17 individuals and 58 entities, including the oil giant Surgutneftegas, and it bans port access and services for 189 additional vessels, doubling the number of blacklisted ships to 342. The sanctions extend to shipping companies, insurers, and actors in third countries enabling Russia’s oil trade. In addition, 31 new entities face tighter export restrictions on dual-use goods and technologies, including firms in China, Belarus, Israel, Serbia, Türkiye, Vietnam, and Uzbekistan, who are accused of supplying drones, machine tools, and other critical components to Russia’s military-industrial sector. Further export restrictions apply to items such as chemical precursors and machine tool parts that support Russia’s war effort. The package also addresses the looting of cultural heritage in occupied Crimea and the illegal exploitation of Ukrainian agricultural production. In total, EU restrictive measures now apply to more than 2400 individuals and entities, all of whom are subject to asset freezes, travel bans, and prohibitions on EU citizens and companies making funds available to them. High Representative Kaja Kallas stresses that this package sends a clear message: Russia’s illegal war comes with mounting costs, and those who enable it will face severe consequences.
• 20 May 2025: The Council imposes additional restrictive measures on three Russian entities belonging to the Armed Forces and implicated in the development and use of chemical weapons in Ukraine. EU restrictive measures against the use and proliferation of chemical weapons now apply to a total of 25 individuals and six entities.
• 27 May 2025: EU Member States endorse the creation of the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) Instrument, which will allow the European Commission to raise up to €150 billion in capital to boost defence capabilities. The funds will help Member States invest in missile defence, drones, and strategic enablers, while strengthening Europe’s defence industry. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen underlined that SAFE is designed not only to bolster the EU’s security, but also to strengthen capabilities for Ukraine and the wider continent. Under the scheme, Member States will submit investment plans within six months.
• 5 June 2025: The EU’s new Ukraine export credit guarantee facility has been activated by means of its first agreement: a €20 million deal between Denmark’s export credit agency EIFO and the European Investment Fund. The facility supports Danish SMEs exporting to Ukraine, giving up to 40 companies access to export credit that will help deliver essential goods, technologies, and services to Ukraine and sustain its economy during the war. This marks the first of 13 agreements across EU Member States, with a total of €300 million in guarantees planned under the programme. The initiative, part of InvestEU, is designed to strengthen EU-Ukraine trade, bolster Ukraine’s recovery, and enhance integration on the country's path to EU membership.
• 6 June 2025: The Commission proposes a common European approach to ensure stability and protection for Ukrainians displaced by Russia’s war. Alongside a proposal for the extension of temporary protection, the Commission is urging Member States to prepare for a gradual transition out of temporary protection, offering pathways into national or EU residence statuses, supporting voluntary and safe returns once conditions allow, and coordinating reintegration with Ukraine. The plan also includes the creation of “Unity Hubs” to provide information on integration and return options, financed under the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), as well as the appointment of a Special Envoy for Ukrainians in the EU.
• 12 June 2025: The justice ministers of the EU Member States discuss how the EU supports the fight against impunity for crimes committed in connection with Russia's war of aggression. They highlight the recent development that representatives from 35 countries, the Council of Europe and the European Commission met in Lviv, Ukraine, on 9 May, where they agreed to establish a special tribunal for the crime of aggression against Ukraine (see above).
• 16 June 2025: The Council renews the restrictive measures imposed in response to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol until 23 June 2026.
• 17 June 2025: The Council adopts a regulation imposing new tariffs on the remaining agricultural products and certain fertilisers from Russia and Belarus not yet subject to extra customs duties. The tariffs on fertilisers will be phased in gradually over a three-year transition period, with implementation closely monitored to protect EU farmers and the fertiliser industry. Once the legislation enters into force, all Russian agricultural goods will be covered by tariffs. The new duties affect products that made up about 15% of EU agricultural imports from Russia in 2023, including nitrogen-based fertilisers. The regulation enters into force on 1 July 2025.
• 17 June 2025: The Commission proposes legislation to end all Russian gas and oil imports by 2027. The stepwise ban starts with new gas contracts in 2026 and ends long-term contracts by 2027, alongside a full stop to the supply of Russian oil. Member States must present diversification plans, with safeguards to ensure supply security and stable prices.
• 26 June 2025: The European Council adopts conclusions marking the 40th anniversary of the Schengen Agreement and celebrating key milestones in EU enlargement. Leaders underline that enlargement remains a geostrategic investment in peace, security, stability, and prosperity. They exchange views with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and reaffirm strong support for Ukraine. In the field of defence and security, EU leaders reiterate the urgency of increasing defence expenditure, strengthening Europe’s defence industry, and advancing joint procurement.
• 30 June 2025: The EU and Ukraine agree on a modernised Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). The new agreements renews the trade liberalisation provisions under the 2014 EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. It will strengthen Ukraine’s gradual integration into the EU Single Market and support its accession path. The updated deal safeguards sensitive EU agricultural sectors, introduces annual reporting on Ukraine’s alignment with EU standards, and includes safeguard clauses to protect Member States in case of market disruption. It also enhances trade flows, balancing Ukraine’s access with EU farmers’ concerns. The agreement now needs formal approval by the EU and Ukrainian institutions.
• 30 June 2025: The Council extends the economic restrictive measures against Russia for another six months (until 31 January 2026) in response to Moscow’s continuing war of aggression and actions destabilising Ukraine.
• 10 July 2025: Leaders of the United Kingdom, France, Ukraine, and other members of the Coalition of the Willing meet in London, Rome and virtually to coordinate stronger support for Ukraine and exert further pressure on Russia. For the first time, U.S. representatives – including US Special Presidential Envoy General Keith Kellogg and Senators Graham and Blumenthal – join the meeting. The Coalition of the Willing, proposed by France and the United Kingdom in February 2025, is designed to support Ukraine’s sovereignty by upholding a ceasefire in the country and deterring Russia once the fighting has stopped. Alongside commitments in supporting Ukraine's defence and endorsing efforts by US President Trump to establish a broader peace process, the leaders agree to expand restrictive measures against Russia’s energy and financial sectors, targeting oil and gas exports, the shadow fleet, and third-country suppliers.
• 10 July 2025: At the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome, the EU unveils a €2.3 billion package to support Ukraine’s recovery, including €1.8 billion in loan guarantees and €580 million in grants, expected to mobilise up to €10 billion in investments. A new European Flagship Fund for Reconstruction launches with €220 million in capital, aiming for €500 million by 2026. The EU also proposes a €3.05 billion disbursement under the Ukraine Facility, releases €1 billion in macro-financial aid, and steps up Ukraine’s EU integration through programmes such as Creative Europe, Erasmus+, and “Roam Like at Home”.
• 10 July 2025: At the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome, the European Investment Bank Group (EIB) and the European Commission announce nearly €600 million in fresh financing for Ukraine’s energy, transport, and business resilience. The package includes loans for hydropower plants, district heating, and major roads and bridges, as well as guarantees and loans to support Ukrainian SMEs. Ten Member States join the InvestEU Ukraine Export Credit Pilot to back EU-Ukraine trade. With these agreements, total EIB Group support to Ukraine is now at €3.6 billion (since 2022).
• 11 July 2025: At the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome, the EU and Ukraine launch BraveTech EU, a joint initiative to boost defence innovation and integrate Ukraine’s battlefield-tested technologies with EU programmes. The project links Ukraine’s BRAVE 1 defence tech platform with the European Defence Fund and the EU Defence Innovation Scheme, supporting joint R&D, hackathons, and collaboration between European and Ukrainian companies, especially start-ups and SMEs. BraveTech EU begins with a €50 million EU contribution to be matched by Ukraine in autumn 2025, and will expand under the European Defence Industrial Programme.
• 14-17 July 2025: A joint international law enforcement action disrupts the pro-Russian cybercrime network NoName057(16). The operation code-named "Eastwood" is coordinated by Europol and Eurojust, carried out in twelve countries, and supported by another seven countries. It leads to the arrest of 2 persons and 7 arrest warrants are issued. Law enforcement authorities are able to disrupt over 100 servers worldwide and to take offline the major part of NoName057(16) main infrastructure. The cybercrime network often operated via DDoS cyberattacks which flood websites or online services with traffic in order to overload them and rendering them unavailable in favour of the Russian Federation. The group was also able to construct their own botnet made up of several hundred servers, used to increase the attack load. It applied sophisticated methods to recruit volunteers. It is estimated that the network had over 4000 supporters.
• 15 July 2025: The Council imposes new restrictive measures against nine individuals and six entities responsible for Russia’s destabilising actions in the EU and Ukraine, including through Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI). The sanctions target, inter alia, the Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Network (RTRS) and two of its senior executives for replacing Ukrainian broadcasting systems in occupied regions with Kremlin-approved networks aimed at suppressing dissent and delegitimising Ukraine’s governance. Also listed is the 841st Separate Electronic Warfare Center and two senior officers linked to GNSS jamming and spoofing operations from Kaliningrad that have disrupted civil aviation and affected navigation in the Baltic States. The Council further blacklists three organisations central to Russian disinformation operations.
• 15 July 2025: The Council imposes restrictive measures on five individuals responsible for serious human rights violations and the repression of civil society and democratic opposition in Russia. The listings target members of the Russian judiciary involved in the persecution of activist Alexei Gorinov, a former municipal deputy in Moscow’s Krasnoselsky district. Those designated face an asset freeze, prohibitions on EU citizens and companies making funds available to them, and an EU travel ban.
• 18 July 2025: The Council adopts its 18th package of economic and individual restrictive measures. The package strikes at Russia’s energy, banking, and military sectors, restricts trade with the EU, and includes complementary measures against Belarus. In total, 55 new listings (14 individuals and 41 entities) have been added, bringing the number of sanctioned persons and entities to more than 2500. Regarding energy, the EU lowers the oil price cap from USD 60 to USD 47.6 per barrel and introduces a dynamic adjustment mechanism to ensure its effectiveness. Sanctions are extended to 105 additional vessels in Russia’s shadow fleet, raising the total to 444, and now covering operators, insurers, an Indian refinery tied to Rosneft. The measures also include an import ban on refined petroleum products made from Russian crude oil, regardless of processing in third countries, except for close EU partners such as Canada, Norway, Switzerland, the UK, and the USA. The EU further imposes a full transaction ban on Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines and ends the exemption allowing Russian oil imports to Czechia. In the financial sector, the Council upgrades the ban on specialised financial messaging services to a full transaction ban, now covering 45 Russian banks. Restrictions also extend to third-country financial and crypto operators that frustrate EU sanctions or support Russia’s war effort, particularly those linked to the Russian System for Transfer of Financial Messages (SPFS). A new ban applies to the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), its sub-funds and affiliated companies, further limiting Moscow’s access to global markets. The EU also prohibits the export of certain financial software to Russia. On the military side, the package targets suppliers of Russia’s defence industry, including Chinese and Belarusian companies, while extending dual-use export restrictions to 26 more entities. Additional export bans worth €2.5 billion are introduced on CNC machines, chemicals for propellants, and other critical goods. The sanctions also address accountability for war crimes. The EU introduces new rules to shield Member States from illegitimate arbitration claims launched under bilateral investment treaties by Russian oligarchs and their proxies, requiring non-recognition of such proceedings within the Union. Lastly, measures against Belarus are strengthened with a full transaction ban on financial messaging services and an embargo on arms imports. High Representative Kaja Kallas emphasises that the package delivers one of the EU’s toughest blows yet to Russia’s war economy, underlining Europe’s determination to keep increasing the pressure until Russia ends its aggression against Ukraine.
• 8 August 2025: The Council approves the fourth regular disbursement of support under the Ukraine Facility, unlocking more than €3.2 billion in funding for Kyiv. The payment is intended to strengthen Ukraine’s macro-financial stability and ensure the continued functioning of its public administration at a time when the country faces severe strain from Russia’s war of aggression.
• 11 August 2025: Ahead of the planned 15 August meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, lead MEPs publish a joint statement, stressing that no peace in Ukraine can be negotiated without the full participation of Ukraine’s democratically elected leadership and the backing of its people. They call on the EU and its Member States to remain united and steadfast in providing political, economic, military, and humanitarian support to Ukraine until a comprehensive and lasting peace is achieved.
• 12 August 2025: EU leaders issue a joint statement welcoming U.S. President Trump’s efforts to end Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, stressing that any just and lasting peace must respect international law, including Ukraine’s sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. They underline that meaningful negotiations require at least a ceasefire and cannot take place without Ukraine’s full participation. Hungary does not associate itself with this statement.
• 9 September 2025: The European Parliament adopts its first enlargement report on Ukraine since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. MEPs reaffirm unwavering support for the country’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. They call on the Commission to open negotiating clusters without delay in order to accelerate Ukraine’s EU membership bid, provided Kyiv continues implementing reforms and aligning with EU rules. 
• 12 September 2025: The Council extends the EU’s restrictive measures until 15 March 2026. The sanctions include travel bans, asset freezes, and a prohibition on making funds or economic resources available to listed individuals and entities. As part of the regular review, the Council removes one deceased person from the list and decides not to renew the listing of one individual. The EU reaffirms its readiness to increase pressure on Russia through additional measures if necessary.
• 16 September 2025: The Council adopts a recommendation establishing a common EU framework to guide the transition of displaced Ukrainians out of temporary protection, once conditions in Ukraine allow for safe and sustainable return. The recommendation aims to ensure coordinated planning among member states and Ukraine, balancing continued solidarity with long-term integration and reintegration objectives. The framework encourages member states to prepare for an eventual phase-out of temporary protection by facilitating access to other residence statuses for eligible Ukrainians. The recommendation also promotes the establishment of “Unity Hubs” — contact points co-financed by EU programmes to assist Ukrainians with administrative procedures, job counselling, and preparations for return. The recommendation was proposed by the Commission on 6 June 2025 (see above)
• 13 October 2025: The Council adopts the EU’s position to reduce or eliminate customs duties on Ukrainian agri-food products, including dairy, meat, fruit, and vegetables. The move follows the June 2025 EU-Ukraine agreement to review the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), aiming for a stable and reciprocal trade framework aligned with Ukraine’s EU accession process. The agreement includes safeguards for sensitive EU sectors such as sugar, poultry, and eggs, while full liberalisation applies only to non-sensitive goods like dairy. The EU-Ukraine Association Committee will now formally adopt the decision as part of the DCFTA review process.
• 16 October 2025: The Danish Council Presidency and European Parliament negotiators reach a provisional agreement on the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP), a €1.5 billion initiative for 2025–2027 to strengthen Europe’s defence readiness and industry.
• 23 October 2025: The Council adopts its 19th package of sanctions against Russia, introducing new restrictive measures across energy, finance, trade, and defence, alongside 69 additional individuals/entities put on the sanction list. The package aims to further weaken Russia’s capacity to continue its war of aggression against Ukraine and extends corresponding measures to Belarus for its ongoing support of Moscow. Further measures were taken against persons responsible for the abduction of Ukrainian children. With regard to energy, the new rules ban imports of Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) by 2027 and reinforce restrictions on state-owned oil producers Rosneft and Gazprom Neft. They also target operators of Russia’s “shadow fleet” and associated registries, refineries, and traders in third countries such as China and the UAE. An additional 117 vessels are banned from EU ports and maritime services. In the financial field, the amended framework imposes transaction bans on banks and oil traders in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, the UAE, and Hong Kong involved in sanctions circumvention. Five further Russian banks—Istina, Zemsky Bank, Absolut Bank, MTS Bank, and Alfa-Bank—are added to the list for transaction bans. Financial measures also target cryptocurrency developers and exchanges. EU operators are banned from providing crypto services and certain fintech services that enable Russia to develop its own financial infrastructure and possibly circumvent sanctions. Trade restrictions are extended to cover a wider range of critical materials and technologies — electronic components, chemicals, metals, and alloys used in arms production. Russia’s largest gold producer is now subject to an asset freeze, while new bans are introduced on services related to AI, high-performance computing, and tourism. The package also contains the first EU-wide measures regulating the movement of Russian diplomats across the Schengen area, requiring prior notification or authorisation for inter-state travel to counter hostile intelligence activity. High Representative Kaja Kallas comments: "It is becoming increasingly difficult for Putin to finance his war. Every euro we deny Russia is one it cannot spend on war."