This article gives an account of the negotiations of the Commission proposal for the Directive
on the fight against fraud to the Union's financial interests by means of criminal law ("PIF Directive"). It also outlines the key elements of the finally adopted legal instrument as well as its significance for the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. The article concludes that the comprehensive approach followed by the EU in fighting crime against the Union budget will lead to tangible results and a significantly better protection of the financial interests of the European Union.

The piece explains how Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 creates the EPPO—the EU’s first true criminal investigation and prosecution office—focused on crimes affecting the Union’s financial interests (PFI) as defined in the PFI Directive (EU) 2017/1371. Set up via enhanced cooperation (20 participating states), the EPPO has a central level (Chief Prosecutor + College) and European Delegated Prosecutors operating nationally. While cross-border work is a step beyond classic mutual recognition, the absence of a single EU criminal procedure leaves tensions between lex fori and lex loci, and a complex decision system (Permanent Chambers) whose efficiency will be tested in practice.
On EPPO–OLAF relations, the article stresses complementarity: OLAF remains an administrative investigator whose reports can feed national criminal cases, and—per Art. 101 EPPO Reg.—should not run parallel admin inquiries when an EPPO criminal case is open, though close information exchange is expected. OLAF’s role stays crucial (especially with non-EPPO EU and third states) … Read more

The article reviews the 2017 evaluation of OLAF’s legal framework (Reg. 883/2013) and sketches next steps. Using the EU’s Better Regulation playbook, the Commission found OLAF delivers clear EU added value and largely effective cooperation (notably via AFCOS)—but its investigative powers are fragmented by dependence on national law, lack direct enforcement tools, and face uneven admissibility of OLAF reports in national proceedings. Differences in cooperation duties across Member States/IBOAs, governance frictions with the Supervisory Committee, and gaps around VAT and access to bank account information also emerged. With the EPPO launching, the Commission plans targeted amendments: align OLAF–EPPO relations, streamline and clarify references to national law, bolster report admissibility and cooperation duties, define OLAF’s VAT remit, improve access to financial data, and tidy up coordination cases—aiming for a stronger, more coherent anti-fraud framework.

The article reflects on the 2017 evaluation of Regulation 883/2013, which governs OLAF investigations, and compares it with other EU enforcement bodies under the Hercule III programme. While the Regulation strengthened safeguards, AFCOS coordination, and investigative tools, its effectiveness is hampered by persistent dependence on national law, leading to jurisdictional fragmentation in on-the-spot checks, digital forensics, and information exchange. This uneven framework undermines consistency in protecting EU financial interests. Comparative analysis with DG COMP, ECB, and ESMA shows that more autonomous EU powers (including sanctions for non-cooperation) could better secure OLAF’s mandate. The author argues that a recalibrated, Union-wide framework for external investigations and information exchange would resolve the tension between OLAF’s broad mandate and its limited, nationally bound instruments.

The article analyses OLAF’s future role in light of the establishment of the EPPO under Regulation 2017/1939. Although OLAF remains focused on administrative investigations, its mandate will increasingly intertwine with EPPO criminal proceedings under a “complementarity model.” Klement highlights key challenges: avoiding duplication of work, ensuring secure and efficient information exchange, and reconciling the different natures of administrative vs. criminal investigations. The risk of inadmissible evidence, conflicts of competence, and strained relations with non-EPPO states is significant. To be an effective EPPO partner, OLAF must raise its standards of guarantees and judicial control, gain easier access to financial data, and ideally acquire legal personality to reinforce its independence and accountability. The conclusion: OLAF now stands “at the gates of criminal law” and requires reform to fully support and complement the EPPO.

The piece examines how the European Investigation Order (Directive 2014/41/EU) seeks speedy, mutual-recognition-based cross-border evidence gathering while still respecting fundamental rights. It notes explicit safeguards (Art. 1(4); refusal ground via Charter, Art. 11(1)(f); validation by a judicial authority; special rules for privacy-intrusive measures like telecoms interception and bank data) but flags gaps: an overemphasis on privacy versus scant mention of other defence rights; vague refusal criteria; and the optional nature of using less intrusive alternatives (Art. 10). The author expects friction where executing states balance mutual trust with rights protection and urges clearer guidance to avoid divergent transpositions. On remedies (Art. 14), challenges in the issuing state cover substance, while executing-state remedies chiefly safeguard fundamental rights and generally don’t suspend execution—all under the Charter’s effective-remedy guarantee. Protection for third parties (witnesses/experts) is left to national law, a missed harmonisation opportunity.