The initial source of the money laundering legislation that is still in full development is Directive 1991/308/EU (also known as the “first directive”) on prevention of the financial system from laundering the proceeds of criminal activities. Directive 2001/97/EU (the “second directive”) on the subject of prevention of employment of the financial system for laundering the proceeds of illicit activities demands a higher standard of obligations on the part of the Member States and extends the scope of the subjects upon whom such obligations are imposed. Italian Legislative Order 231/2007 brings into effect the Directive 2005/60/EU (the “third directive”). It introduces… Read more

The article analyses the ECJ’s judgment in Bonda (C-489/10), which addressed whether exclusions and reductions of agricultural aid under EU law constitute criminal penalties. The Court confirmed that such measures are specific administrative instruments linked to participation in aid schemes and aimed at protecting the EU budget, not criminal sanctions. Consequently, the ne bis in idem principle does not preclude subsequent criminal proceedings for the same conduct. The authors discuss the reasoning of the ECJ, its reference to ECtHR case law on the notion of “criminal proceedings,” and the implications for applying ne bis in idem under both the Charter and the ECHR in national proceedings.

This article analyses the evolution and functioning of international monitoring mechanisms established to evaluate states’ implementation of anti-corruption instruments. After outlining the main global and regional conventions adopted since the mid-1990s, including those of the OAS, EU, OECD, Council of Europe, and the United Nations, the paper examines the diverse peer-review systems that accompany them, such as the OECD Working Group on Bribery, GRECO, the UNCAC Implementation Review Group, and MESICIC. While these mechanisms share a mutual-evaluation logic, they differ significantly in scope, procedural rigor, transparency, and political impact. The article highlights growing concerns about duplication, administrative burden, and insufficient coordination among the various evaluation bodies, especially as the EU prepares to launch its own Anti-Corruption Report. It argues that improved cross-referencing, streamlined review cycles, and structured cooperation, potentially through a joint international platform, are essential to avoid overlaps and enhance the effectiveness of global anti-corruption monitoring.

This article examines the ongoing reform of the European Union’s anti-corruption mechanism against the backdrop of a large and vulnerable EU budget and persistent shortcomings in protecting the Union’s financial interests. It identifies two core weaknesses of the current framework centred on OLAF: the lack of effective criminal follow-up by national prosecuting authorities and recurrent concerns over the compatibility of OLAF’s investigative practices with fundamental procedural rights. The article analyses the Commission’s post-Lisbon reform initiatives, including proposals to strengthen OLAF’s investigative efficiency and accountability, improve cooperation with national authorities, Eurojust and Europol, and develop a more integrated administrative–criminal law approach. Particular attention is paid to the envisaged establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) under Art. 86 TFEU as a potential game-changer for prosecutions of offences affecting the EU’s financial interests. The contribution argues that, if properly implemented, the combined package of enhanced OLAF supervision, better coordination, and a … Read more