The article traces the genesis, negotiations, and content of Directive 2013/48/EU on the right of access to a lawyer in criminal proceedings and European Arrest Warrant (EAW) proceedings. Inspired by Salduz case law, the Directive sets detailed rules on access to a lawyer from the earliest stages of proceedings, including during questioning and investigative acts, and introduces safeguards on confidentiality, derogations, and remedies. It also innovates by granting requested persons in EAW cases the right to appoint a lawyer in the issuing state. The author highlights the political compromises among Member States and with the European Parliament, noting that the Directive constitutes a milestone in the EU roadmap on procedural rights, balancing high protection standards with prosecutorial interests.

The article reflects on the post-Lisbon framework for EU criminal policy. While the Treaties introduced QMV and co-decision, they also restricted competences to certain procedural and substantive aspects under the principle of conferral. Nilsson warns against legislative lethargy under the “Festina Lente” approach and calls for further work in evaluation, judicial training (including a proposed “Eurotrain”), crime prevention, and harmonisation of offences such as corruption, money laundering, and organised crime. He stresses that fragmented approximation undermines mutual trust and effectiveness, and argues that long-term development will require Treaty change to overcome the casuistic limits of Arts. 82–83 TFEU. Ultimately, the EU must decide between deeper integration towards federal-style criminal law or maintaining fragmented national systems with cautious, piecemeal approximation.

The article analyses how national and international developments have reshaped the roles of the Dutch judge of instruction and the public prosecutor in international judicial cooperation. Traditionally, the judge of instruction controlled preliminary investigations and the use of coercive measures, also in cross-border cases. With the abolition of the preliminary investigation and the expansion of prosecutorial powers, the public prosecutor has become the central authority, particularly in extradition matters, the European Arrest Warrant, and the European Evidence Warrant. The author further discusses the implications of the EPPO initiative, highlighting the risks of political influence over ancillary competence and suggesting that the European Public Prosecutor’s Office should have full competence for offences linked to the protection of the EU’s financial interests.

As explicitly mentioned in the Treaty of Nice,1 and preceded by a provisional unit (“pro-Eurojust”),2 Eurojust was established through a Decision of 28 February 2002.3 The latter was amended by the Decision of 16 December 2008 on the strengthening of Eurojust.4 Shortly after the celebration of its 10th birthday in 2012, Eurojust became the subject of a new reform. On the 17th of July 2013, the Commission presented a proposal for a Regulation on the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), based on Art. 85 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU).5 This initiative was… Read more