This article analyses the European Union’s evolving counterterrorism framework in light of recent attacks and the changing nature of the terrorist threat. It traces the EU’s “event-driven” approach since 9/11, the Madrid and London bombings, and the development of the 2005 EU Counterterrorism Strategy with its four pillars: Prevent, Protect, Pursue, and Respond. The authors focus on the integration of risk-based thinking, distinguishing between measures to reduce threats (e.g. radicalisation prevention, intelligence sharing) and those to reduce vulnerability (e.g. legal cooperation, crisis response mechanisms). They argue that an effective EU framework requires a balance between these approaches, deeper cooperation among Member States, and alignment with transatlantic partners.

The article examines the prospects for automatic mutual recognition of judicial decisions in EU criminal matters, focusing on freezing and confiscation orders. It outlines the legal basis for mutual recognition under the Lisbon Treaty, contrasts it with harmonisation, and reviews existing instruments and their shortcomings. Drawing lessons from the European Arrest Warrant, the authors argue that mutual recognition can enhance efficiency while preserving legal diversity, provided fundamental rights and proportionality are safeguarded. They conclude that no Member State should become a safe haven for criminals exploiting free movement to shield unlawfully gained assets.

The article analyses OLAF’s position as a supranational EU body in relation to national judicial authorities, focusing on the sharing of information in fraud and corruption investigations affecting the EU’s financial interests. It outlines the advantages of OLAF’s supranational status—such as recognised competence, speed, and established networks—while detailing legislative limitations stemming from its hybrid nature and reliance on Member States to act on its judicial recommendations. The author examines operational practices, data protection constraints, cooperation with third countries, and the interplay between formal legal frameworks and informal working relationships, concluding with lessons for the future European Public Prosecutor’s Office.

This article examines the Council of Europe’s role in addressing the threat of foreign terrorist fighters through the Draft Additional Protocol to the 2005 Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. Developed in response to UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014), the protocol supplements the “Mother Convention” by requiring State Parties to criminalize conduct such as participation in terrorist associations, receiving terrorist training, travelling abroad for terrorism purposes, and related funding or facilitation. It outlines the scope, definitions, and human rights safeguards built into these offences, situating them within existing international and EU counter-terrorism instruments.

The article analyses France’s counterterrorism policy in the wake of the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack. It traces the evolution of French counterterrorism law since 1986, highlighting shifts after major attacks, and examines post-Charlie measures including expanded intelligence powers, new databases, reinforced offences on glorification and preparation of terrorist acts, and strengthened frameworks against terrorist financing. The author discusses the rapid legislative response, its focus on surveillance and law enforcement capacities, and the tensions it raises between security objectives and the protection of fundamental rights.

The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009 resulted in a number of important changes for the democratic accountability of European criminal law. Among them is the enhanced role of the European Parliament as regards the adoption of EU legislation in this area. This coincides with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU Charter) achieving binding status.1 A new European Parliament was installed in July 2014, followed by the confirmation of the Commission presided over by Jean-Claude Juncker. Together with the Council, these European institutions now have the obligation to make a convincing… Read more