The article reflects on the 2017 evaluation of Regulation 883/2013, which governs OLAF investigations, and compares it with other EU enforcement bodies under the Hercule III programme. While the Regulation strengthened safeguards, AFCOS coordination, and investigative tools, its effectiveness is hampered by persistent dependence on national law, leading to jurisdictional fragmentation in on-the-spot checks, digital forensics, and information exchange. This uneven framework undermines consistency in protecting EU financial interests. Comparative analysis with DG COMP, ECB, and ESMA shows that more autonomous EU powers (including sanctions for non-cooperation) could better secure OLAF’s mandate. The author argues that a recalibrated, Union-wide framework for external investigations and information exchange would resolve the tension between OLAF’s broad mandate and its limited, nationally bound instruments.

The article analyses OLAF’s future role in light of the establishment of the EPPO under Regulation 2017/1939. Although OLAF remains focused on administrative investigations, its mandate will increasingly intertwine with EPPO criminal proceedings under a “complementarity model.” Klement highlights key challenges: avoiding duplication of work, ensuring secure and efficient information exchange, and reconciling the different natures of administrative vs. criminal investigations. The risk of inadmissible evidence, conflicts of competence, and strained relations with non-EPPO states is significant. To be an effective EPPO partner, OLAF must raise its standards of guarantees and judicial control, gain easier access to financial data, and ideally acquire legal personality to reinforce its independence and accountability. The conclusion: OLAF now stands “at the gates of criminal law” and requires reform to fully support and complement the EPPO.

The piece examines how the European Investigation Order (Directive 2014/41/EU) seeks speedy, mutual-recognition-based cross-border evidence gathering while still respecting fundamental rights. It notes explicit safeguards (Art. 1(4); refusal ground via Charter, Art. 11(1)(f); validation by a judicial authority; special rules for privacy-intrusive measures like telecoms interception and bank data) but flags gaps: an overemphasis on privacy versus scant mention of other defence rights; vague refusal criteria; and the optional nature of using less intrusive alternatives (Art. 10). The author expects friction where executing states balance mutual trust with rights protection and urges clearer guidance to avoid divergent transpositions. On remedies (Art. 14), challenges in the issuing state cover substance, while executing-state remedies chiefly safeguard fundamental rights and generally don’t suspend execution—all under the Charter’s effective-remedy guarantee. Protection for third parties (witnesses/experts) is left to national law, a missed harmonisation opportunity.

The article assesses France’s transposition of EU directives on the rights of suspects in criminal proceedings. While reforms have strengthened participation in trials, the right to information, and access to interpretation and translation, implementation often falls short of the directives’ spirit. Access to a lawyer during police investigations remains limited, with restrictions on private meetings and delayed access for detained suspects. Disclosure of case materials is only partially ensured, and the use of self-incriminating statements continues despite ECtHR case law. Gros concludes that France has transposed the directives literally but without ambition, prioritising procedural efficiency and security over robust protection of suspects’ rights, raising questions about the future of the French investigative judge model.

The article examines how the principle of equality must be safeguarded in proceedings of the forthcoming European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). Falletti identifies two main challenges: ensuring equal rights for suspects and ensuring equal handling of cases. Since the EPPO applies both its Regulation and national criminal procedure, differences in procedural safeguards across Member States risk undermining equality, particularly in access to lawyers and defence costs in cross-border cases. On case allocation, fears of forum shopping are addressed by mandatory criteria and oversight by Permanent Chambers, with national courts retaining judicial review. While the system relies heavily on national law and courts, ongoing harmonisation through EU directives and ECJ control should mitigate inequalities. The EPPO’s effectiveness will ultimately depend on practice in balancing European coordination with equal treatment of suspects.