Guest Editorial Dear Readers, Security is among Europeans’ key concerns in 2015.1 Even though ensuring internal security lies primarily with the Member States, the new and more complex threats that have emerged require further synergies at all levels. The European Agenda on Security presented by the Commission on 28 April 2015 highlights the EU’s added value to Member States’ actions. It underlines that the EU needs a solid criminal justice response to terrorism, covering investigation and prosecution of those who plan terrorist acts or are suspected of recruitment, training, and financing of terrorism as well as incitement to commit a… Read more

This article analyses the European Union’s evolving counterterrorism framework in light of recent attacks and the changing nature of the terrorist threat. It traces the EU’s “event-driven” approach since 9/11, the Madrid and London bombings, and the development of the 2005 EU Counterterrorism Strategy with its four pillars: Prevent, Protect, Pursue, and Respond. The authors focus on the integration of risk-based thinking, distinguishing between measures to reduce threats (e.g. radicalisation prevention, intelligence sharing) and those to reduce vulnerability (e.g. legal cooperation, crisis response mechanisms). They argue that an effective EU framework requires a balance between these approaches, deeper cooperation among Member States, and alignment with transatlantic partners.

Cross-border, asset-related crime exploits a persistent enforcement gap in Germany’s confiscation regime. Existing tools — conviction-based forfeiture under §§ 73 ff. German Criminal Code (StGB) and the narrowly framed conviction-independent procedure of § 76a StGB — fail whenever offenders abscond, die, or hide behind complex offshore structures. This article addresses two research questions: (1) Can a non-conviction-based confiscation (NCBC) mechanism close this gap effectively? (2) Is such a mechanism compatible with the property guarantee of Art. 14 Basic Law and the fair-trial safeguards of Art. 6 European Convention on Human Rights?
Building on Directive (EU) 2024/1260 on asset recovery; comparative practice in Switzerland (SRVG 2015), Italy (confisca di prevenzione), and the United Kingdom (Proceeds of Crime Act 2002); and German constitutional jurisprudence, the author proposes a Vermögenseinziehungsgesetz (VEG, Asset Confiscation Act). The VEG is conceived as an in rem civil procedure before specialised chambers: the public prosecutor must demonstrate the … Read more

In April 2024, the European Union’s Regulation on the Transparency and Targeting of Political Advertising (PAR) entered into force. In further efforts to ensure a transparent, safe, predictable and trustworthy online environment within the EU — particularly in the wake of the Cambridge Analytica scandal — the Regulation aims to respond to the dangers and misuse of microtargeting, a sophisticated data-based method of online manipulation. Despite PAR’s lofty aspirations, the nature and functions of online manipulation are fraught with more conceptual and regulatory difficulties than it appears to acknowledge or resolve. First, PAR’s reliance on outmoded data protection principles and their largely unforeseeable effects on data disposition and aggregation complicate the problem of online user consent. Second, without adopting a broader “supervisory perspective” for identifying harmful microtargeting and interest misalignment, PAR risks endorsing only transparency without accountability. Third, a noticeable regulatory loophole risks prompting a surge in unregulated political advertising … Read more

This article examines the administrative penalty system under the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in cases of over-declarations of agricultural land. It focuses on the “yellow card” legislation that was introduced in 2016 and applicable until 2022, analysing its practical implications. This “yellow card” system introduced reduced penalties for minor infractions but capped penalties at 100% of the granted aid. This approach can be regressive, as it eliminates additional penalties for irregularities over 50%. As a result, deterrent effects are lessened for serious infractions. Next to a legal analysis of the system, the author uses mathematical analysis to show that irregularities of over 40% do not lead to increased penalties. He argues that the approach followed has encouraged abuses and concludes that the EU should refrain from readopting a sanction system like the “yellow card” in the future.