

EU Reactions to Russian War against Ukraine: Overview October – November 2024

News

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This news item continues the reporting on key EU reactions following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022: the impact on the EU's internal security policy, on criminal law, and on the protection of the EU's financial interests. The following overview covers the period from October 2024 to November 2024. For overviews of the previous developments: from February 2022 to mid-July 2022 → [eucrim 2/2022, 74-80](#); from the end of July 2022 to the end of October 2022 → [eucrim 3/2022, 170-171](#); from November 2022 to December 2022 → [eucrim 4/2022, 226-228](#); from January 2023 to June 2023 → [eucrim 1/2023, 6-9](#); from July 2023 to September 2023 → [eucrim 2/2023, 116-117](#); from October 2023 to January 2024 → [eucrim 4/2023, 313-315](#); from January 2024 to June 2024 → [eucrim 1/2024, 9-11](#); from July 2024 to September 2024 → [eucrim 2/2024, 94-95](#).

- 8 October 2024: In response to Russia's hybrid actions towards the EU, the Council adopts a new legal framework of restrictive measures to target individuals and entities responsible for supporting or benefiting from Russia's destabilizing activities globally. [Council Decision \(CFSP\) 2024/2643](#) introduces new grounds on the basis of which the EU can impose smart sanctions against natural or legal persons who are involved in Russia's hybrid campaigns. Importantly, the new legal regime not only applies to activities directed against the EU and its Member States, but also to Russian hybrid activities targeting international institutions or third countries.
- 8 October 2024: In a [statement by the High Representative](#) for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy accompanying the Council Decision concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia's destabilizing activities, the European Union strongly condemns Russia's escalating hybrid actions against the EU, its Member States, and partners. According to the statement, the alleged behaviour can be deemed reckless, irresponsible, and in violation of international law and the rules-based international order. These activities include cyber-attacks, disinformation campaigns, sabotage, arson, and the instrumentalisation of migration, as well as disruptions to satellite communications, violations of European airspace, and physical attacks on individuals within the EU. The EU identifies these actions as part of a coordinated hybrid campaign by Russia aimed at dividing European society, destabilising Member States, weakening resilience, and undermining EU support for Ukraine.
- 11 October 2024: At the [JHA Council meeting](#), the Hungarian Council Presidency, the Commission and Eurojust give an update on the most recent developments as regards the fight against impunity of war crimes committed in the context of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. Ministers welcome

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that Ukraine adopted legislation on 24 August 2024 to pave the way for Ukraine's accession to the Rome Statute.

- 11 October 2024: A [new factsheet](#) provides information on the key achievements of the von der Leyen Commission in supporting Ukraine against Russia's war of aggression. The factsheet mentions, for instance, that, since the beginning of the war, the EU has mobilised and developed unique means of economic, humanitarian, and military assistance, bringing the total support provided by the EU and its Member States to almost €124 billion, including €1.5 billion from the proceeds of Russian immobilised assets. The factsheet also highlights the Ukraine Facility, which will provide Ukraine with up to €50 billion in the form of grants and concessional loans between 2024 and 2027.
- 14 October 2024: The Council [adopts restrictive measures](#) against five individuals and a Russia-based non-governmental association whose goal is to promote Russia's interests abroad. They are held responsible for destabilising actions in Gagauzia, an autonomous territorial unit in Moldova. The sanctions impose asset freezes, travel bans within the EU, and prohibit providing funds or economic resources to the listed individuals and entity. These measures increase the total under the EU's sanctions framework for Moldova to 16 individuals and two entities. This sanctions framework, established in April 2023, addresses actions that undermine Moldova's sovereignty, democracy, and security. Destabilisation efforts, which have intensified with Russia's aggression against Ukraine, directly threaten the stability of the EU's external borders.
- 14 October 2024: The Council [adopts](#) restrictive measures against seven individuals and seven entities in [response to Iran's transfers of missiles and drones to Russia](#) for use in its war against Ukraine. These measures follow the European Council's March 2024 warning of swift action if Iran were to transfer ballistic missiles or related technology to Russia. The sanctions target individuals and entities involved in developing and transferring unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), missiles, and related technology.
- 17 October 2024: The [European Council takes several conclusions on Ukraine](#). The European Council reaffirms its unwavering support for Ukraine in the face of Russia's continued aggression, condemns the violations of international law and pledges comprehensive assistance across political, financial, military, and humanitarian domains. It emphasises the importance of a just and lasting peace based on the UN Charter and Ukraine's Peace Formula, while asserting that no decisions about Ukraine will be made without its involvement. The G7 commitment of €45 billion to support Ukraine's military, budgetary, and reconstruction needs is reiterated and the use of extraordinary revenues from immobilised Russian assets to aid Ukraine, subject to legal safeguards, is highlighted. The conclusions also back Ukraine's recovery and reconstruction efforts and support displaced persons, including refugees in EU countries, by ensuring adequate financial assistance to Member States carrying the largest burdens. Lastly, the European Council reiterates its commitment to Ukraine's integration into the European Union, emphasising continued reform support on its path toward EU membership.
- 24 October 2024: On behalf of the EU, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy [expresses](#) deep alarm over reports that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) is sending troops to support Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine. The EU also criticises Russia's concerning shift on denuclearisation, accusing it of violating its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and compromising its responsibilities as a permanent UN Security Council member. It reiterates that the DPRK cannot achieve nuclear weapon state status under the NPT.
- 29 October 2024: [Regulation \(EU\) 2024/2773 of the European Parliament and of the Council](#) enters into force which establishes the Ukraine Loan Cooperation Mechanism and makes available to Ukraine exceptional macro-financial assistance in the form of a loan (the "MFA Loan") with a view to supporting Ukraine in covering its urgent financing needs arising from Russia's ongoing aggression. The mechanism supports Ukraine in repaying up to €45 billion in loans provided by the EU and G7 partners. The repayment of these loans relies on future revenues generated from immobilised Russian

sovereign assets, alongside voluntary contributions from EU Member States, third countries, and other sources. The MFA loan is linked to policy conditions under the Ukraine Facility and Ukraine Plan, with oversight systems in place to prevent fraud and irregularities.

- 30 October 2024: The European Commission adopts its [2024 Enlargement Package](#), highlighting significant progress made by Ukraine on its path toward EU accession. The opening of accession negotiations in June 2024 marked a milestone, recognising Ukraine's commitment to pursuing critical reforms despite the challenges posed by Russia's ongoing aggression. The screening process, a key step in aligning Ukrainian law with EU standards, is progressing smoothly. The Commission anticipates the opening of negotiations on policy clusters, starting with the fundamentals, as early as 2025, provided Ukraine meets the necessary conditions.
- 8 November 2024: The Council adopts a [decision extending the mandate of the European Union Military Assistance Mission](#) in support of Ukraine (EUMAM Ukraine) by two more years, until 15 November 2026, with a budget allocation of nearly €409 million for the period from November 2024 to 2026. EUMAM Ukraine remains central to the EU's military support, focusing on enhancing the military capacity of Ukraine's Armed Forces (UAF). Under the extended mandate, EUMAM Ukraine will cooperate with NATO, particularly through the NATO Security Assistance and Training for Ukraine (NSATU), ensuring transparent and reciprocal information sharing.
- 14 November 2024: The Commission [gives a positive statement](#) that Ukraine has satisfactorily fulfilled the nine agreed reform indicators for a further payment of over €4 million under the Ukraine Facility. Accomplished steps for the payment include increased capacity building to fight corruption in Ukraine and measures for improved asset recovery. For the disbursement of the money, the Council must confirm the Commission's conclusions and adopt an implementing decision.
- 18 November 2024: The [Council broadens the scope of restrictive measures against Iran](#) due to its military support for Russia's war in Ukraine and armed groups in the Middle East and Red Sea regions. The new legal framework allows the EU to target the use of vessels and ports for transferring Iranian-made drones (UAVs), missiles, and related components. The EU introduces a ban on exporting, transferring, and supplying components from the EU to Iran that are used for missile and UAV production. A transaction ban is also imposed, prohibiting dealings with ports and locks owned, operated, or used for transferring Iranian UAVs, missiles, or related technology to Russia. [Additionally, the Council sanctions](#) one individual and four entities following Iran's missile and drone transfers to Russia.

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